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Abstract: This paper examines trends in household consumption and saving behaviour
in each of the last three recessions in the UK. The ‘Great Recession’ has been diﬀerent from
those that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. It has been both deeper and longer, but also the
composition of the cutbacks in consumption expenditures diﬀers, with a greater reliance on
cuts to nondurable expenditure than was seen in previous recessions, and the distributional
pattern across individuals diﬀers. The young have cut back expenditure more than the old,
as have mortgage holders compared to renters. By contrast, the impact of the recession has
been similar across education groups. We present evidence that suggests that two aspects of
ﬁscal policy in the UK in 2008 and 2009 - the temporary reduction in the rate of VAT and
a car scrappage scheme – had some success in encouraging households to increase durable
purchases.
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11 Introduction
The Great Recession was the deepest and longest recession in the UK since the 1930s and
is likely to have had marked eﬀects across all types of individuals. However, diﬀerent house-
holds will have been aﬀected to diﬀerent extents, and may well have responded by cutting
consumption in diﬀerent ways. The aim of this paper is to show how consumption of diﬀer-
ent goods and services has been aﬀected by the recent recession, and how these eﬀects diﬀer
across diﬀerent types of household. We compare the Great Recession to previous recessions
in the UK to highlight both the similarities across recessions and also the distributional and
other aspects of this recession which mark it out as being diﬀerent.
Our focus is on the impact of the recession on household consumption. Consumption
is both the largest component of GDP and the component most immediately connected to
the welfare of individuals and households. Comparing the extent of cutbacks in household
consumption between recessions therefore provides a good indicator of the severity of their
impact. Furthermore, a comparison between the changes in consumption by households of
diﬀerent types in a particular recession illustrates the overall distributional impact of the
recession.
In this paper we document a number of features that have been common to each of the
previous three recessions in the UK. These include a propensity for households to increase
their saving as the economy enters a recession and a tendency for households to focus their
cutbacks to the greatest extent on some particular goods and services, such as durable goods,
catering and alcohol. The most recent recession, though, has been diﬀerent in a number of
ways. First in its depth and length. Annual growth in consumption through the most recent
recession has been nearly six percentage points below average growth in expansionary years.
This is a substantially larger contraction than in either of the two previous recessions. The
falls in consumption could, perhaps, have been even greater in the most recent recession if it
were not for a number of other diﬀerences: accommodative monetary and ﬁscal policy and,
at least until the time of writing, a labour market that has been relatively resilient given
the large falls in GDP that have occurred. With respect to the length of the downturn - at
time of writing, four years after the beginning of the recession, there is no evidence yet of a
sustained recovery taking hold. A second feature that distinguishes the most recent recession
from its two predecessors concerns the composition of the cuts in household expenditure. In
previous recessions, there was a marked tendency for households to reduce their purchases of
durables to a greater extent than nondurables. In this recession, this diﬀerence is much less
marked. Durable purchases, after an initial decline, recovered swiftly before falling again,
while purchases of nondurables continued to decline steadily throughout the recession. One
possible explanation for this is the combination of the temporary reduction in the main rate
of VAT that was in place for 13 months from December 2008 and the introduction of a
2vehicle scrappage scheme. Both of these initiatives would be expected to increase durable
purchases while in operation, partly by bringing forward purchases that would otherwise have
happened in the future. A ﬁnal diﬀerence in the recent recession was in the distribution of
cuts by home ownership: home-owners, especially those with outstanding mortgages, have
made larger cuts in expenditure than those renting, whereas in previous recessions, there was
no diﬀerence across these groups.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some background to our
work; it introduces our data (which includes both micro survey data and aggregate data from
the national accounts) and explains how we deﬁne the start and endpoints of a recession in
our empirical work. Section 3 provides some descriptive context on the most recent recession.
The heart of the paper is in Sections 4 and 5, which compare the most recent recession to the
two preceding recessions. Section 4 illustrates how household expenditure, its components
and the household saving ratio have evolved since the mid 1970s, with a particular focus on
the cyclical properties of those aggregates. Section 5 examines how the cuts to expenditure in
each recession were distributed across types of households, deﬁned according to age, education
and housing tenure. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Data
Our analysis uses both aggregate and micro survey data. The aggregate data that we use
are from the UK Economic Accounts (UKEA). The microdata that we use come from the
Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS).1 Our LCFS data cover the period 1976 to 2010; the
data from the UKEA additionally covers the period up to the ﬁnal quarter of 2011.
For our purposes both of these sources of data have strengths and weaknesses. Both data
sources allow us to investigate how much households reduced their spending (in aggregate)
during a recession and what goods and services they cut back on. The key advantage of the
LCFS is that it allows us to examine which households cut back to the greatest extent. We can
use the microdata to perform analysis separately by household groups deﬁned according to
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of interest. The disadvantages of the LCFS
include the fact that it is available with a greater lag than the UKEA data (so that we
currently have data only to the end of 2010) and that it is not feasible to examine quarterly
changes. There are two reasons for the latter. The ﬁrst is that quarterly sample sizes
are small, making estimates imprecise. The second is that households report spending on
diﬀerent goods over diﬀerent intervals, and these intervals are sometimes longer than a quarter
1This was previously known as the Expenditure and Food Survey (2001-2008) and the Family Expenditure
Survey (to 2001); in what follows we use LCFS to refer to all of these surveys.
3(particularly for durables and other infrequently purchased goods).2 Therefore, when using
the LCFS data we perform the analysis on an annual basis. Further detail on our use of the
LCFS data is included in the appendix.
The UKEA data allows us to analyse quarterly changes and is available with less of a
lag. In addition, the UKEA data contains information on corporate investment, government
purchases and net exports. The sum of these aggregates and household consumption gives
GDP, and so we can place the falls in household consumption in the context of what has
happened to the other components of national income.
2.2 Dating recessions
There is no universally-accepted rule for deﬁning the start and end-points of a recession. In
the US the Business Cycle Dating Committee at the National Bureau of Economic Research
deﬁnes a recession as “a period between a peak and a trough [in economic activity]” (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research 2011). They operate no ﬁxed rule for arriving at their
judgments, nor is “economic activity” interpreted solely in terms of GDP. There is no similar
body in the UK, and diﬀerent authors have typically deﬁned recessions in keeping with their
own understanding of the term (see Chamberlin 2010 and Jenkins 2010 for two recent papers
that use slightly diﬀerent deﬁnitions of recessions). A popularly-applied deﬁnition in the
media is that a recession can be deﬁned as two consecutive quarters of negative growth in
GDP. While the mechanical nature of this method makes it easy to apply, it is not universally
accepted and Layton and Banerji (2003) argue that the two-consecutive-quarters rule should
be considered neither necessary nor suﬃcient for determining whether or not an economy is
in recession.3
In our empirical analysis we use two deﬁnitions of a recession, one based on quarters
and one based on years. This is driven by the fact that, as we noted in Section 2.1, the
LCFS does not have suﬃcient sample sizes to examine accurately quarterly changes in the
components of expenditure; as a result we must deﬁne the entirety of each calendar year
as either in a recession or not when using the LCFS. We deﬁne a recessionary period as
consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth and we deﬁne a recessionary year as any year
that contains at least one recessionary quarter. This deﬁnition yields three recessions since
1976: the ﬁrst from 1980 Q1 to 1981 Q1, the second from 1990 Q3 to 1991 Q3 and the third
from 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q3. In our empirical analysis we deﬁne recession one, therefore, as
2Respondents are issued with a diary in which they are asked to record all purchases over a two week
period. In addition, there is a questionnaire which records purchases of infrequently-bought items (such as
large consumer durables) over the past number of months (between 3 months and 12 months depending on
the item in question).
3That paper also provides, as does O’Donoghue (2009), some interesting commentary on the origin and
historical use of some of the various deﬁnitions of a recession.
4containing calendar years 1980 and 1981, recession two containing calendar years 1990 and
1991 and recession three containing calendar years 2008 and 2009.4
It is worth emphasising that though, on the working deﬁnition applied here, the recent
recession ended in the third quarter of 2009, GDP growth since then has been so low and
other indicators of recovery have been so few, that on a broader deﬁnition (such as that
applied by the NBER), the UK could be considered as in recession for a much longer period.5
2.3 Relative prices and changes in purchases of components of ex-
penditure 1977-2010
Before showing how the purchases of components have changed since 1977 we need to adjust
total nominal expenditure and nominal expenditure on particular goods for changes in prices
over the period. Adjusting the nominal expenditure on components of expenditure for inﬂa-
tion is less straightforward than it is for total expenditure. Nominal expenditure is converted
into real expenditure using an all-goods price index (the Retail Prices Index (RPI)) and, in
principle, the same approach can be used to convert nominal spending on durable goods, say,
to real spending on those goods. However if the price of durable goods has been changing at
a rate diﬀerent from the average price change of all goods, such a procedure will not yield a
measure of the volume of durables purchased.
Table 1 displays relative price movements in UK across both recessions and non-recessionary
periods. The ﬁrst column shows the average annual change in the general level of prices mea-
sured according to the Retail Prices Index. The two additional columns show annual average
changes in the prices of semidurables and durables relative to nondurables. There is a down-
ward trend in the relative prices of durables and semidurables and this is more marked in
recessionary years than in non-recessionary years.
This means that a change in real spending calculated by deﬂating by an all-goods price
index will be driven by a combination of the change in volume purchased and the change in
relative prices. As an illustration, consider average household purchases of durables between
2005 and 2010: Average real spending on durables (i.e. average durable spending adjusted
for the average change in all prices) fell by approximately 10% between these two years.
However, the volume of purchases of durables increased by nearly 6%: the fall in expenditure
arose because households, on average, purchased a greater quantity of durables in the later
year, while having to pay less for those goods. To get a measure of volume purchased of a
4In all but two of the years that we deﬁne as non-recessionary the volume of household expenditure rose.
The exceptions were in 1977 and 2011 when it fell by 0.4% and 1.2% respectively.
5Indeed we note that the ﬁrst estimate of GDP growth in the ﬁrst quarter of 2012 is negative, following
from negative growth in the last quarter of 2011, putting the UK in recession according to the “two successive
quarters of negative growth” rule. We do not use these ﬁrst estimates, which are subject to (often substantial)
revision, in our analysis.
5Table 1: Average relative change in prices
Changes in price level Changes in prices relative to non-durables
RPI Semi-durable Durable
Average (all years) 5.3% -3.9% -3.3%
Average (non-recessionary) 4.7% -3.3% -2.8%
Average (recessionary) 8.1% -6.8% -5.7%
Average (1980 recession) 14.9% -8.8% -6.8%
Average (1990 recession) 7.7% -4.3% -4.5%
Average (2008 recession) 1.7% -7.2% -5.8%
Source: Authors’ calculations using Retail Prices Index data.
particular good or service that is consistent over time, we must inﬂate (or deﬂate) spending
on each category by a price index speciﬁc to that category, rather than by the all-items RPI.
The panels in Figure 1 take, in turn, these two procedures for deﬂating nominal expendi-
tures. In panel (a) we show the growth rate in real spending on nondurables, semidurables
and durables while in panel (b) we show the growth rate in the volume of purchases. Fo-
cussing on panel (b) it is clear that the trend rates of growth in purchases of durables and
semi-durables (5.3% and 5.7% respectively, on average, over the period) have been higher
than that of nondurables (1.8%). This increase in the purchases of the former categories has
been coincident with a steady fall in their prices relative to nondurables. Moreover, the fall in
the relative price of durables and semidurables tends to be more marked in periods when level
of economic activity is contracting than in times when it is expanding. This highlights again
the importance of not deﬂating by a single price index, such as the RPI or CPI (Consumer
Prices Index).
In addition to the importance of getting volumes correct, it is woth noting that in reces-
sionary years, relative price falls might have supported durable purchase volumes somewhat,
and it is possible that durables purchase volumes would have fallen by an even greater extent
had the relative price of durables not fallen.
3 The Great Recession
In this section we describe some of the features of the most recent recession in the UK (for
a similar treatment of the same time period in the US see Pistaferri et al., 2011). The
estimated peak-to-trough fall in real GDP during the recession (with the peak in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2008 and the trough in the third quarter of 2009) was 6.8%. This compares with
peak-to-trough falls of 2.5% in the recession in the early 1990s, 4.7% in the early 1980s and



















































Sources: Authors’ calculation using UK Economic Accounts and Retail Prices Index. In panel (a) nominal
quantities are converted into real quantities using the all-items Retail Prices Index. In panel (b), nominal
quantities in each series are converted into a consistent volume measure using a price index speciﬁc to that
series.
73.4% in the early 1970s.6 Even by the ﬁnal quarter of 2011, GDP remained 4.1% below
its pre-recession peak. As we will see in Section 4, the falls in household expenditure were
deeper and have been longer lasting in this most recent recession than in previous ones.
These falls are our primary interest in this paper. First, however, and to put those falls in
context, this section summarises the trajectory of GDP and its components. In addition to
household expenditure, these components are corporate investment, government purchases
(which comprises both government ﬁnal consumption and government investment)7 and net
exports. We split household expenditure into two components: non-durable consumption
(purchases of nondurables and semidurables) and consumer durables.8
Figure 2 shows how these components of GDP have evolved since the ﬁrst quarter of
2008. Panel (a) shows the change (measured in billion pounds) in each of these since 2008
Q1 and panel (b) shows the evolution of an index of their magnitude with the level in 2008 Q1
set equal to 100. Figure 2(a) shows that household nondurable consumption and corporate
investment have made roughly equal contributions to the fall in GDP since the recession
began - falling by a similar magnitude in the ﬁrst year, after which the former has stayed
reasonably constant while the latter fell by more and has since exhibited a modest recovery.9
These changes are informative about the contribution of each component to the overall
fall in GDP; they do not, however, illustrate which components exhibited the greatest pro-
portionate changes relative to their pre-recession levels. A fall of the same absolute amount
in consumption and corporate investment will represent a larger proportionate fall in the
latter than in the former given that household consumption typically has a value three to
four times that of corporate investment. Figure 2(b) shows the proportionate fall in each
component over the period of the recent recession. One striking fact that emerges from these
ﬁgures concerns the path taken by purchases of consumer durables. These initially exhibited
a greater (proportionate) fall than consumer purchases of nondurables but from the middle
of 2009 began a sharp recovery. This recovery happened at the same time as two govern-
6These falls are in the seasonally-adjusted chained volume measure of GDP at market prices (UK Economic
Accounts series ABMI). Our peak-to-trough measure is deﬁned as the period between the quarter before an
initial fall in GDP and the quarter before the subsequent rise in GDP. On this measure there were other
smaller recessions in the post World War II period. The only one of the recessions that we reference here
where the peak in GDP is subject to some ambiguity is that in the early 1980s. The use of a slightly diﬀerent
rule would yield falls for that recession of 6.0% or 2.8%.
7Note that this quantity will not account for all government activity. To the extent that a change in
government expenditure is comprised of changes in net transfers of cash to the household sector the eﬀect of
this additional expenditure will be seen in changes to consumption by the household sector rather than in
changes in government purchases.
8In constructing these ﬁgures, we have subtracted actual and imputed rent from nondurable consumption,
to ensure the consistency of these ﬁgure with our later analysis. As a result the components do not quite
add up to GDP.
9Hall (2010) carries out a similar analysis in the US and ﬁnds a diﬀerent pattern, with almost the entirety
of the fall in GDP there coming from declines in investment and consumer durables.































































































































































































































































































































































Source: UK National Economic Accounts.
Notes: Panel (a) shows changes measured in billions of pounds in each component of GDP since the ﬁrst
quarter in 2008. Panel (b) expresses these components as an index with the magnitude in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2008 set to 100. Net exports can, unlike the other series, take negative values and as a result we do not
show an index for its time path in panel (b).
9ment policies which could have encouraged durable purchases. The ﬁrst was a temporary
reduction in the main rate of Value Added Tax (VAT) from 17.5% to 15% announced in the
Pre-Budget Report of November 24th 2008. The reduced rate, heralded as a ﬁscal stimulus
and advertised extensively by retailers, was in operation between the beginning of Decem-
ber 2008 and the beginning of January 2010. Purchases of durables fell back somewhat in
early 2010, after the expiration of the temporary tax reduction and showed no growth over
the following year. This pattern of a rise in purchases of storable goods (such as durables)
immediately before an anticipated tax increase on those goods is consistent with economic
theory and the empirical evidence on how consumers respond to anticipated price increases
(see Crossley et al. 2009).
The second policy was the introduction of a vehicle scrappage scheme which subsidised
the purchase of new cars. This scheme operated from May 2009 to March 2010. We will show
below, in Section 4, that, in comparison to the previous two recessions in the UK, there was
a smaller fall in the growth rate of purchases of vehicles through the recession. This suggests,
albeit tentatively, that the car scrappage scheme may have been successful in bringing car
purchases forward; it does not, of course, provide any evidence that there was any ‘new’
spending (i.e. spending that would not have occurred anyway in the coming years) on car
purchases. For a further discussion of the VAT cut and the car scrappage scheme alongside
an initial assessment of their impact on consumer behaviour see Crossley et al. (2010).
Two further features of the economy during the Great Recession may have been associ-
ated, as either a cause or an eﬀect, with smaller falls in household consumption than might
otherwise have occurred. These are unually accommodative monetary policy (historically
low interest rates and quantitative easing) and the relative resilience (relative to the falls in
GDP) of the labour market. The Bank of England base rate was reduced to 0.5% in March
2009 where it remains at the time of writing.10 It is important to note, however, the base rate
gives a very incomplete picture of intertemporal prices facing consumers, and the resulting
incentives for saving and spending. This is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the expected
real borrowing rate on various types of loans (panel (a)) and the expected real rate of return
for a number of diﬀerent asset classes (panel (b)).11 The vertical line shows the beginning
of the recession. Both borrowing rates and returns to saving fell in the ﬁrst quarter of the
recession as inﬂationary expecations rose quickly. As the recession took hold, this was quickly
10In contrast the Bank of England base rate remained substantially higher throughout the previous two
recessions and while it fell from its peaks as those recessions progressed, the falls were of a more modest
kind than those seen in the most recent recession. In fact, in both cases high interest rates were one of the
proximate causes of the recession, but were considered necessary to reduce inﬂation and additionally, in the
1990s to support the value of Sterling in keeping with the UK’s membership of the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism.
11We apply the basic rate of tax (either 20% or 22% during this period) and use the median expected
rate of inﬂation measured according to the Bank of England/Gfk NOP Inﬂation Attitudes Survey (Bank of
England (2012)) .
10reversed. As The Bank of England base rate fell through the autumn of 2008, nominal and
real returns to saving fell. However, the real cost of many kinds of borrowing actually rose
(mortgages being the exception). Thus this recession was characterized foremost by a widen-
ing of spreads between saving and borrowing rates. Falling returns to saving may have given
savers some incentive to increase current expenditures while rising borrowing costs (accom-
panied by substantial reductions in the availability of consumer credit, Chamberlin, 2010)
likely dampened the spending of other consumers.
Turning to the labour market, falls in employment were 3.4% during the 1990s recession,
2.4% during the 1980s recession and 1.9% during the most recent recession (Jenkins 2010).
The depth of the fall in employment, while substantial in each recession, was more moderate
in the most recent recession in spite of the greater fall in output that occurred. Gregg &
Wadsworth (2010) note that there has been substantially less drift into inactivity (with the
exception of a greater student population) or onto inactivity beneﬁts than was seen in the
previous two recessions.
4 Comparing Recessions and Recoveries: spending com-
ponents, prices, and saving
In this section we show, using UKEA data, how household purchases of nondurables, semidurables,
durables, and household saving evolved during each of the past three recessions in the UK.
4.1 Nondurables, Semidurables and Durables.
Unlike in the recessions that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in the UK, the proportionate fall
in durable purchases in the recent recession was of a similar magnitude to the proportionate
fall in nondurable purchases. The next two ﬁgures show that, since the beginning of 2008,
both fell initially, recovered somewhat and then fell again. Figure 4 shows the time proﬁle
for household purchases of nondurables. The values are expressed as an index based (at 100)
in the quarter preceding the beginning of the recession. It is immediately clear that the
fall in household nondurable purchases was substantially deeper and has been longer lasting
in the most recent recession than in either of the ﬁrst two. By the fourth and eleventh
quarter after the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s recessions respectively, purchases of non
and semidurables had returned to their pre-recession level. In the current recession, by the
14th quarter after the beginning of the recession (quarter 4 of 2011, our most up-to-date
observation) these purchases remained over 5% below the peak registered in the ﬁrst quarter
11Figure 3: Expected real borrowing rates (panel (a)) and expected real post-tax rates of return
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12of 2008.12
Figure 5 shows the analogous trends for household purchases of durables. The initial
path followed in each recession was similar with a cumulative fall in durable purchases on
the order of 10% over the ﬁrst year. The paths then diverge. Over the following year in
1980s recession there was a moderate recovery, in the 1990s recession a stagnation, and in
the recent recession a strong recovery. The last of these represents the sharp increase in
durable purchases recorded through 2009, coincident with the temporary cut in the main
rate of VAT and the vehicle scrappage scheme, that we discussed in Section 3. This recovery
did not represent the beginning of a period of sustained growth in durable purchases; durable
purchases fell back somewhat from their post-recession peak in the last quarter of 2009, and
remained, in our most recent quarter of data, over 6.5% below their pre-recession peak. The
trajectories following the third year after the beginning of the recession look quite diﬀerent
for the 1980s and the 1990s recessions, with much stronger growth in durable purchases in
the earlier period.
Table 2 shows the volume of purchases, net of trend in non-recessionary years, varied
across these categories and between recessions. It also shows the movements, net of trend, in
total expenditure and disposable income. The numbers in the table are coeﬃcients from re-
gressions of the annual growth rates (of purchases, expenditures or income) on a constant and
a set of three dummies, one for each recession, set to one if the observation represents a year
in that recession. Again we see that, relative to the past two recessions, the Great Recession
has seen larger falls in nondurables purchases, and smaller falls in durables purchases. We
also see that, in all three recessions, total expenditure fell by more than disposable income,
implying a rise in saving, which we discuss further below.
4.2 More Detailed Composition of Expenditure
So far our discussion of the composition of the spending cuts has considered three broadly-
deﬁned categories: nondurables, semidurables and durables. It is possible to analyse narrower
categories. In their collection of price data for the derivation of the RPI, the Oﬃce for
National Statistics deﬁne 14 categories of goods and services. In Table 3 we show how the
volume of purchases, net of trend in non-recessionary years, varied across these categories
and between recessions. The numbers in the table are coeﬃcients from a regression of the
annual growth rates in purchases of a particular commodity on a constant and a set of
three dummies, one for each recession, set to one if the observation represents a year in that
12This is a fall in a national aggregate so does not make a correction for the number of households or
individuals in the economy although the results do not materially diﬀer when we look at per household or
per capita consumption. The analysis that we carry out in the next sub-section when we use the microdata
is at the average household level.
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14recession.
Some categories are consistently aﬀected by recessions. These include household goods
(mainly large consumer durables) and catering (e.g. restaurant meals). These categories
largely represent luxuries, which are easier to postpone, or indeed cancel altogether, than
necessities (see Browning & Crossley 2000).
There are a number of diﬀerences between the most recent recession and previous down-
turns. First, in this recession, there was a statistically signiﬁcant and relatively large (at
6.1 percentage points per year) fall in the growth reate purchases of food.13 Between De-
cember 2007 and December 2009 there was an increase in the relative price of food (that is
an increase in the price of food over and above the increase in the all-items Retail Prices
Index) of 8%, which presumably explains some of this fall. Also of note is the absence of any
statistically signiﬁcant fall in the volume of purchases of household fuel. Between December
2007 and December 2009, the relative price of household fuel rose by 23%. The lack of any
discernible response to this (at an average level at least) speaks to the very price-inelastic
nature of the demand for household fuel. A ﬁnal point concerns the fall in purchases within
the motoring category which was a great deal more modest than in either of the previous
two recessions. The temporary VAT cut and the vehicle scrappage scheme could well have
supported spending in this area by bringing forward purchases that would have happened
subsequently.
4.3 Saving
We turn now to the household saving ratio. Figure 6 shows the evolution of this quantity in
the quarters following the start of each recession. Panel (a) shows the level (in percentage
points) in each quarter, and panel (b) shows the diﬀerence between the level in each quarter
and the level in the quarter immediately preceding the ﬁrst quarter of the recession. Panel
(a) illustrates quite clearly that the saving ratio of the household sector was very diﬀerent
at the start of each of the three recessions, which is at least partly driven by the fact that
the savings rate has been trending downwards over the past 30 years. In the quarter before
the beginning of the 1980s recession the saving ratio14, at 11.5%, was approximately located
13This, of course, does not mean that individuals are consuming fewer calories or food with less nutritional
content. Recall that volume of expenditure on food (say) is deﬁned as nominal expenditure on food deﬂated
by a food price index. Falls in volume mean that individuals are paying less for the food that they purchase
even after allowing for the changes in the price of food. A fall in volume of food therefore could involve either
purchases less food, or a greater tendency to purchase inexpensive types of food. Aguiar & Hurst (2005) show
that while there is evidence of a substantial fall in spending on food after retirement, there is less evidence
of falls in consumption of food as the time spent shopping for and preparing food also increases substantially
in retirement.
14The saving ratio is quite a volatile series, and being the diﬀerence between two large aggregates is
necessarily measured with substantial error. To remove some of this volatility the saving ratios that we
discuss here and those that we present in the ﬁgure are three-quarter moving averages.
15Table 2: Annual growth (net of trend) in volumes of income and expenditure during recessions
Category Recessions
1980 1990 2008
Income -1.6* 0.9 -3.1*
Total expenditure -3.5* -3.9* -5.4*
Non-durables -3.2* -3.4* -6.8*
Semi-durables -4.8* -3.9* -5.8*
Durables -11.5* -13.6* -8.8*
Notes: Stars indicate that a particular number is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level; i.e., the
average rate of growth in the recession in question diﬀered statistically from the average rate of growth in
non-recession years. Coeﬃcients represent percentage point deviations from mean growth in non-recessionary
years. For example, take the -2.0 at the top left of the table. This means that in the recession starting in
1980, the growth rate in average income was 2 percentage points per year below the average growth rate in
non-recessionary years.
at the 90th percentile of the distribution of quarterly saving ratios observed between 1976
and 2010; in the quarter before the beginning of the 1990s recession, the saving ratio (8%)
was at the 50th percentile while in the quarter before the most recent recession it (2.2%)
was the joint lowest observed in any quarter of the time period. Despite these diﬀerences, in
each of the three recessions the saving ratio climbed as the economy went into recession.15
In the case of the 1980s recession, the climb was both the shortest-lived and of the smallest
magnitude. The initial increase in the saving ratio after the beginning of the recession was
greatest in the 2000s and in the ﬁnal quarter of 2011 was at 7.8%.16 Alan et al. (2012) model
the determinants of this change in the savings ratio in recessions.
5 Comparing Recessions by Household Type
In this section we discuss the extent to which the changes in expenditure diﬀered among
diﬀerent types of household. Recessions can aﬀect households in many ways. Falling asset
values will reduce wealth levels; expectations of future earnings will be lowered for some
households and uncertainty increased; unemployment reduces current income and may un-
dermine labour market prospects later in life (Arulampalamm 2001). Many of these factors
will tend to bear to a greater or lesser extent on diﬀerent types of households. Older house-
holds, for example, are more likely to have wealth stocks and so be aﬀected by falls in asset
15Moore & Palumbo (2010) provide a similar analysis of the last three recessions in the US and document
an increase in the savings ratio at the beginning of the current recession. In the previous two recessions in
the US (in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s), the personal saving rate was essentially unchanged.
16The household saving ratio reﬂects only saving done directly by households and not saving done by the
corporate sector, much of which is owned by the household sector in the UK.




Food -0.2 -2.6 -6.1*
Leisure services -5.6* -6.4 -9.5*
Household fuel -4.1* -2.0 -3.6
Household services -6.5 5.8 -7.8*
Catering -6.4* -7.4* -7.4*
Personal goods and services -2.2 -3.1 -8.1*
Alcohol -5.1* -5.0* -8.3*
Public transport -3.6* -8.7 -7.7
Tobacco -1.1 -1.6 -2.9*
Semidurables
Clothes and shoes -3.9* -4.1* -2.9
Durables
Motoring -10.5* -9.8* -3.5*
Household goods -12.8* -13.1* -10.2*
Leisure goods -12.3* -11.8* -1.9
Housing
Housing 0.3 1.4 -0.7
Notes: Stars indicate that a particular number is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level; i.e., the
average rate of growth in the recession in question diﬀered statistically from the average rate of growth in
non-recession years. Categories are placed into one of four broad types (nondurables, semidurables, durables,
housing) according to which of those types accounts for the largest part of spending in the category (the
narrowly-deﬁned categories do not always ﬁt neatly into exactly one broadly-deﬁned category). Within
these broad types, categories are sorted from high to low with respect to their average budget share in
2010, our most recent year of data. Coeﬃcients represent percentage point deviations from mean growth in
non-recessionary years. For interpretation of the coeﬃcients see notes to Table 2.






























































































































Source: UK Economic Accounts. The household saving ratio is seasonally-adjusted.
Notes: The household saving ratio shown in panel (a) is smoothed using a three quarter moving average.
Changes since the beginning of the recession are diﬀerences between the smoothed value in a particular
quarter and the smoothed value in the quarter before the recession started.
18values, while the employment eﬀects (both those contemporaneous with the recession and
the future eﬀects) will be more of a concern for younger households.
We deﬁne households along three dimensions: their age, their education, and their housing
tenure. We need to split households along dimensions which are not aﬀected by the recession.
We cannot therefore split households by their position in the income distribution because this
will be aﬀected by how severely the recession has aﬀected them. We do not have information
on past income in our cross-section data and so we use education and age. While housing
tenure may well change because of the recession, it is likely to adjust slowly.
We show how income, total expenditure and three of its components - nondurables,
semidurables, and durables have changed in each recession. These three components, to-
gether with housing expenditure, add up to total expenditure. We do not show housing here,
due to the fact that it is not possible to obtain a good measure of housing consumption (as
opposed to spending on housing) using our microdata.
5.1 By Age
We take the ‘age of a household’ to be the age of the oldest individual in the beneﬁt unit
containing the ‘household reference person’.17 We split households into three groups: the
young (those aged less than 35), the middle aged (those aged 35 or greater and less than
aged 65), and the old (those aged 65 or older).
Table 4 shows the income and expenditure changes for the young, the middle aged and
the old that occurred in each recession. The numbers (as in Tables 2 and 3) represent the
coeﬃcients on recession dummies in a regression of the annual growth rates on three of those
dummies. A coeﬃcient (in the ‘young’ or the ‘old’ rows) is in boldface if the eﬀect associated
with a particular recession diﬀered statistically (at the 10% level) between that age group
and the youngest age group.
While there are large diﬀerences in some of the point estimates reported in Table 4 in the
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in total expenditure
between the groups. There were signiﬁcant diﬀerences, however, in expenditure in the most
recent recession. Average annual expenditure growth in 2008 and 2009 was 7.6 percentage
points below its non-recessionary trend value for households aged less than 35 and it was 5.8
percentage points below the trend for households aged between 35 and 64. The deviation
from the non-recessionary trend for the oldest households (i.e. pensioners) was not statis-
tically diﬀerent from zero and was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from expenditure growth for the
youngest group. The extent to which younger households have been aﬀected by the most
recent recession is striking- their income and their expenditure both fell at rates of about 8
17The household reference person was known as the head of the household until the issuance of the 2001
data. A beneﬁt unit is a single individual or couple along with any dependent children that they have.
19percentage points below trend.
In none of the three recessions did the oldest households experience a statistically sig-
niﬁcant fall in either income growth or growth in total expenditure relative to the non-
recessionary trend. Further, the average income of the oldest households actually grew at a
rate signiﬁcantly above trend in recession two.




Young -2.3* 0.7 -8.2*
Mid. -1.3 0.2 -2.3
Old -0.8 2.8* 0.1
Expenditure
Young -5.0* -5.1* -7.6*
Mid. -2.7* -4.1* -5.8*
Old -2.2 -2.4 -1.3
Nondurables
Young -5.1* -5.7* -8.5*
Mid. -2.8* -2.9* -7.0*
Old -1.2 -3.3* -4.0*
Semidurables
Young -7.1* -9.6* -11.9*
Mid. -3.4* -3.0* -4.0*
Old -5.1 2.0 -5.9*
Durables
Young -15.9* -10.4 -12.5
Mid. -7.9* -15.8* -9.2*
Old -13.2* -7.2* -3.0
Notes: Stars indicate that a particular number is statistically diﬀerent from zero at at least the 10% level,
that is - the average rate of growth the recession in question diﬀered statistically from the average rate of
growth in non-recession years. A coeﬃcient in the ‘mid’ or ‘old’ rows are shown in boldface if it is statistically
diﬀerent from the same coeﬃcient for the young at at least the 10% level.
5.2 By education
In this subsection we examine whether the education level of those within a household dis-
played any association with the extent to which households were aﬀected by each recession.
We look at education as it will be correlated with the ‘permanent income’ of households. We
divide households into two groups according to the age at which its most educated member
left full-time education. Our ‘low education’ group is comprised of households where every
member left education at or before the age of 16. Our ‘high education’ group is comprised of
those which contained at least one member who left full-time education at or after the age
20of 17. A diﬃculty with splitting households according to their level of education attainment
is that the proportion of households in the high education group rises from 18% in 1978 (the
ﬁrst year in which we have information on education in our data) to 44% in 2009, and so the
underlying composition within each education group is likely to be markedly diﬀerent.
Table 5 shows the impact of each recession on both of these education groups. The ﬁrst
recession, on average, passed the more educated by. Their income actually increased at a
rate signiﬁcantly greater than trend; there was no signiﬁcant change in expenditure indicating
that the additional income was dedicated towards greater saving. The less educated group
in the ﬁrst recession, on the other hand, experienced income growth at a rate 2.9 percentage
points below trend. It has been well documented (see, for example, Blundell & Etheridge
2010) that during the 1980s, income inequality increased substantially. Our results here
suggest that the dynamics that drove that process were operative during the recession of the
1980s.
During the later two recessions, however, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the impact of the recession on the average incomes of the two groups or in the average
consumption responses to the recession.
Table 5: Changes in income, expenditure and its components in the three recessions; com-
paring those with less and those with more education
1980 1990 2008
Income
Low -2.9* -0.2 -3.6
High 3.5* 2.5 -2.7
Expenditure
Low -4.0* -4.1* -6.6*
High -0.8 -4.5* -5.2*
Nondurables
Low -3.7* -4.6* -8.0*
High -1.4 -1.4 -6.2*
Semidurables
Low -5.9* -1.4 -3.9*
High 1.2 -9.9* -7.1*
Durables
Low -12.1* -12.0* -11.1*
High -8.9 -18.1* -7.0
Notes: Stars indicate that a particular number is statistically diﬀerent from zero at at least the 10% level,
that is - the average rate of growth the recession in question diﬀered statistically from the average rate of
growth in non-recession years. A pair of coeﬃcients are shown in boldface when those two numbers are
statistically diﬀerent from each other at at least the 10% level.
215.3 By housing tenure
The ﬁnal characteristic by which we split households is with regard to their housing tenure.
We divide households into those who rent their accommodation (whether privately or from
a local authority) and those who own their property (whether outright or who are paying
oﬀ a mortgage). One of the reasons that households might cut back on their expenditure
during a recession is the possibility of a wealth eﬀect when its assets fall in value even in the
absence of any change to that household’s income or employment prospects. An alternative
reason is that if the household is paying oﬀ a mortgage, interest rate payments are included
in expenditure, and so variation in interest rates in recessions will impact on expenditure
directly.
Each of the three recessionary periods that we deﬁne has coincided with a fall in the value
of housing. The fall in the ‘real’ average property price18 in the UK between the quarter before
the recession began to its ﬁnal quarter was in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s respectively 16%,
24% and 15%. This will have had a substantial impact on household asset portfolios. The
net value of housing (i.e. value of housing less mortgage debt) made up 39% of the aggregate
household private (i.e. excluding state pension wealth) portfolio between 2006 and 2008 (see
Daﬃn (2009) p.8) with the other components being pension wealth (39%), ﬁnancial wealth
(11%) and physical wealth (11%). Owner-occupiers who are still paying oﬀ mortgages will
have been particularly vulnerable to the fall in the value of housing; any fall in the value of
the property that they own will be magniﬁed by virtue of their leveraged position.
We emphasise that the content of this subsection does not contain an estimate of the
magnitude of wealth eﬀects, nor even a formal test of their presence (for these, see Banks et al.
2012). Diﬀerences that we observe between renters and owners could be down to many reasons
other than wealth eﬀects from house prices. These could include, for example, diﬀerent shocks
to earnings or employment, diﬀerent shocks to perceptions of future uncertainty, wealth eﬀects
coming from diﬀerent holdings of non-housing assets19, or the diﬀerential impact of falls in
interest rates (to which we return below).
The most interesting feature of these recessions illustrated in Table 6 is the quite con-
siderable diﬀerence in the fall in expenditure between renters and owner-occupiers in the
most recent recession. Expenditure growth was 6.4 percentage points below trend for owner-
occupiers compared to 1 percentage point below trend for renters. These deviations from
(respective) trends are statistically diﬀerent from one another. This is in spite of no diﬀer-
18By ‘real’ property prices we mean the average nominal value of housing adjusted for changes in economy-
wide inﬂation as measured by the RPI. The data on property prices that we use comes from Nationwide
(2011).
19Although, if wealth eﬀects are operating through falls in the prices of assets other than housing, we
would expect them to be stronger for owner-occupiers than they would be for renters. Crossley & O’Dea
(2010) show that, on average, owner-occupiers are more likely to have private pensions and have higher liquid
ﬁnancial wealth than renters.
22ential deviations from trends in income growth. The pattern was diﬀerent in recessions one
and two. In those periods there was no statistical diﬀerence observed between the deviations
from the trend growth in the expenditure of renters and owners.
Table 6: Changes in income, expenditure and its components in the three recessions; com-
paring renters with owner occupiers
1980 1990 2008
Income
Renter -2.5* 0.4 -1.6
Owner -0.7 0.2 -3.0
Expenditure
Renter -3.6* -5.8* -1.0
Owner -3.0* -4.1* -6.4*
Expenditure Renter -3.6* -5.8* -1.0
(ex. mort. interest) Owner -3.7* -4.8* -5.2*
Nondurables
Renter -3.2* -6.1* -3.7*
Owner -2.9* -3.3* -7.4*
Semidurables
Renter -8.6* -7.6* -5.4
Owner -2.1* -3.7* -5.4*
Durables
Renter -11.1* -16.5 -4.7
Owner -11.0* -13.6* -9.0*
Notes: Stars indicate that a particular number is statistically diﬀerent from zero at at least the 10% level,
that is - the average rate of growth the recession in question diﬀered statistically from the average rate of
growth in non-recession years. A pair of coeﬃcients are shown in boldface when those two numbers are
statistically diﬀerent from each other at at least the 10% level.
A partial (proximate) explanation is that during the Great Recession, interest rates fell
while in the previous two recessions interest rates remained high, with the bank base rate
increasing in the early part of the 1980s recession before falling slightly, and the bank base
rate falling through the 1990s recession but at a pace that was more moderate than the
dramatic reductions that were seen in 2008 and in 2009. Mortgage interest is included in the
measure of expenditure shown here so these falls will have reduced expenditure for (some)
mortgagors. We report expenditure excluding interest payments, and this shows that while
part of the decline in spending by owners is due to lower interest payments, the deviation
in other spending from its non-recessionary trend is signiﬁcant and, at 5 percentage points,
large indicating that property owners are likely to have increased their saving during the
most recent recession.
To assess this further, we present in Table 7 the changes in income and expenditure for
mortgagors and owners-outright separately. The latter group will not be directly aﬀected
23(through mortgages at least) by changes in interest rates. In addition they will be, all
else equal, less vulnerable to wealth shocks as their housing wealth is not leveraged. The
table shows that there was no statistically signiﬁcant fall in income for either group in the
most recent recession while the deviation in the growth of total expenditures from its non-
recessionary trend was 2.4 percentage points for owners-outright. The deviation in growth
from the trend in non-recessionary years for mortgagors was also signiﬁcant and much larger
at 7.9 percentage points. Some combination of wealth eﬀects and reduced servicing costs
associated with mortgages have, no doubt, contributed to the large increases in saving among
those paying oﬀ mortgages in the most recent recession. The fact that income and expenditure
growth fell by similar magnitudes for the owners-outright indicates that they are not likely,
on average, to have increased saving.
Table 7: Changes in income, expenditure and its components in the three recessions; com-
paring mortgagors with owners-outright
1980 1990 2008
Income
Mortgagor -1.6 -2.0* -2.8
Owner Out. 1.7 4.4* -2.0
Expenditure
Mortgagor -2.8* -5.4* -7.9*
Owner Out. -3.1* -2.2 -2.4*
Expenditure Mortgagor -3.9* -6.2* -6.5*
(ex. mort. interest) Owner Out. -3.1* -2.2 -2.4*
Nondurables
Mortgagor -2.5* -4.2* -7.8*
Owner Out. -3.4* -2.2* -5.9*
Semidurables
Mortgagor -3.1* -6.2* -5.9*
Owner Out. 0.7 1.8 -2.7*
Durables
Mortgagor -11.4* -16.1* -14.2*
Owner Out. -9.8* -8.5 -0.1
Notes: Stars indicate that a particular number is statistically diﬀerent from zero at at least the 10% level,
that is - the average rate of growth the recession in question diﬀered statistically from the average rate of
growth in non-recession years. A pair of coeﬃcients are shown in boldface when those two numbers are
statistically diﬀerent from each other at at least the 10% level.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that the recent recession has been diﬀerent in a number of ways from
the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s. First, the falls in household consumption
24have been deeper than in either of the previous two. Second, we ﬁnd that in the most recent
recession, purchases of durables (excluding housing) contracted by a similar magnitude to
nondurable goods and services. By contrast, in the previous two recessions purchases of
durables were cut by substantially more than nondurables. One potential reason for the
relative resilience of durable purchases through the recession is the temporary reduction in
the main rate of VAT and the vehicle scrappage scheme. Third, when we look at the eﬀect
on diﬀerent types of household, home-owners have made larger cuts to expenditure than
non-home owners, whereas in the past there has been no diﬀerence across these households.
In addition to highlighting these diﬀerences between the current recession and the previous
two, this paper highlights some features that are common to each of the recessions. These
include a tendency for households to cut back on their spending on certain goods and services
(e.g. alcohol, eating out, household durables) and the fact that household saving rose sharply
in each recession.
The aim of this paper was to draw out patterns of consumption behaviour through re-
cessions. We have not tried to model how these consumption decisions have been reached
by households and without such a model it is hard to identify whether observed diﬀerences
are due to the eﬀect of the recession or to the composition of the groups. Alan et al. (2012)
provide such a framework but without disaggregating into types of consumption expenditure.
This modelling task is one important future step to understanding our observations on the
impact of recessions.
Appendix
It has been documented elsewhere (Brewer & O’Dea 2012) that there are inconsistencies
between the aggregate levels of income and expenditure implied by the LCFS and those re-
ported as part of the UKEA. In particular, the proportion of the total household expenditure
recorded in the UKEA that is reported by households in the LCFS has been falling steadily
since the early 1990s.20 We adjust the microdata so that the implied aggregates are consistent
with the UKEA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we base our adjustment on the
assumption that under-reporting varies across time but not systematically across households.
For a particular household, the proportion of expenditure that they report is equal to the
ratio of aggregate expenditure implied by reports to the LCFS in their year of sampling to
20Low recorded expenditure in microdata relative to the National Accounts aggregates has also been
documented in the US. See Attanasio et al. (2006) for a comparison of the implied aggregate expenditure
recorded in the US Consumer Expenditure Survey and aggregates published as part of the National Income
and Product Accounts.
25the aggregate measure in the UKEA in that same year.21
Much of the our analysis of expenditure patterns uses broadly-deﬁned expenditure cate-
gories - e.g. total expenditure, nondurable expenditure, semidurable expenditure and durable
expenditure. We also present results on changes in spending on groups deﬁned more narrowly
(e.g. food). To account for potential under-reporting of expenditures here, we gross up the
individual reports of expenditure on a narrowly-deﬁned category with the grossing factor
pertaining to the broadly-deﬁned category to which it belongs. For example, given that the
narrowly-deﬁned category food is part of the broadly-deﬁned category nondurables, we gross
up food expenditure reports in a given year by the ratio of aggregate implied nondurable
expenditure in the LCFS in that year to aggregate nondurable expenditure in the UKEA in
that same year.
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